Some Reflections on the Theory of the “Liquidity Trap” by Palacio Vera, Alfonso
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES 
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
VICEDECANATO 
Campus de Somosaguas, 28223 MADRID. ESPAÑA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Documento de Trabajo 2009-002 
 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY  
OF THE “LIQUIDITY TRAP” 
 
 
 
Alfonso Palacio-Vera  
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES 
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
VICEDECANATO 
Campus de Somosaguas, 28223 MADRID. ESPAÑA 
 
Esta publicación de Documentos de Trabajo pretende ser cauce de 
expresión y comunicación de los resultados de los proyectos de 
investigación que se llevan a cabo en la Facultad de Ciencias 
Económicas y Empresariales de la Universidad Complutense de 
Madrid. 
 
 
 
Los Documentos de Trabajo se distribuyen gratuitamente a las 
Universidades e Instituciones de Investigación que lo solicitan. No 
obstante, están disponibles en texto completo en el archivo 
institucional complutense e-prints con objeto de facilitar la difusión en 
Internet de las investigaciones producidas en este centro. 
 
 
http://eprints.ucm.es/dt.html 
  
 
 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY  
OF THE “LIQUIDITY TRAP” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Alfonso Palacio-Vera  
 
 SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY OF THE “LIQUIDITY TRAP” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alfonso Palacio-Vera 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: We provide a formal definition of the “liquidity trap” (LT) according to which, a LT arises if a 
combination of high precautionary saving, low investment and stringent conditions for access to bank credit 
stemming from a high degree of liquidity preference make the sum of the “neutral” interest rate and the 
expected inflation rate fall short of the term/risk premium on long-term interest rates. We then compare the 
“New Consensus” (NC) in macroeconomics as expounded in Woodford (2003) and the Post-Keynesian 
(PK) approach regarding the causes of a LT. We argue that in the NC approach a LT is a phenomenon 
caused by unusually large transitory shocks that depress the “neutral” interest rate temporarily. By contrast, 
we argue that in the PK approach an economy may also exhibit a “structural” or long-lasting LT even in the 
absence of large adverse shocks. Finally, we discuss a number of theoretical issues recently raised in the 
rapidly growing literature on the LT.  
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 SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY OF THE “LIQUIDITY TRAP” 
 
 
1.- Introduction  
The most salient feature of the institutional framework that characterizes most, if 
not all, present-day OECD economies is that central banks (CBs hereafter) fine-tune the 
economy through conventional monetary policy actions with a view to achieving an 
inflation target in the medium-term. We define the former as the regular actions that 
characterize the day-to-day setting of short-term nominal interest rates by CBs. However, 
the latter are subject to a zero lower bound (ZB hereafter). This constraint arises because, 
in a money-using economy, individuals will not be willing to hold any financial asset 
other than money when the nominal yield of the former is equal or less than zero. Its 
existence may cause a “liquidity trap” (hereafter LT), i.e., a situation where the CB is 
unable to push real interest rates down far enough so as to keep inflation constant in the 
absence of supply shocks.1 This feature was termed by Kaldor (1939) the “great 
constitutional weakness” of monetary policy because it prevents the short-term nominal 
interest rate from operating equally freely in both directions. The existence of the ZB has 
been well-known at least since the publication of Keynes´ General Theory (Keynes, 
1936). Notwithstanding, it has only been in the recent past that mainstream economists 
have turned their attention to it. In particular, proponents of the “New Consensus” in 
macroeconomics (hereafter NC) have led this line of research.2 Two events explain, 
according to us, this phenomenon. First, it has become much clearer, especially since the 
early 1990s, that CBs fine-tune the economy through changes in nominal short-term 
interest rates rather than through changes in the monetary base. Second, there is the 
protracted period of sluggish growth and deflation experienced by the Japanese economy 
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since the 1990s and its attribution by some prominent scholars to the occurrence of a LT 
(Krugman, 1998; Svensson, 2005).  
In order to show the causes of the emergence of a LT we develop a simple Post-
Keynesian (hereafter PK) model. Central to the workings of the model is the notion of the 
“neutral” interest rate which we define as the long-term real interest rate which is neutral 
with respect to the inflation rate and tends neither to increase it nor to decrease it in the 
absence of supply shocks.3 The model is then used to discuss a number of issues raised 
by recent contributions to the theory of the LT.   
The structure of the study is as follows. Section 2 presents a formal definition of a 
LT. Section 3 presents the NC approach to the analysis of the LT whereas section 4 
presents the PK approach. According to us, the crucial difference between the two 
approaches is that, in the former, a LT is viewed as a fairly rare and transitory situation 
which may only emerge in the wake of unusually large adverse shocks that depress the 
“neutral” or “natural” interest rate whereas, in the PK approach, an economy may also 
exhibit a “structural” or long-lasting LT. More specifically, an economy will exhibit a 
“structural” LT if a combination of high precautionary saving, low investment, and 
stringent bank credit conditions stemming from a high degree of liquidity preference 
(hereafter LP) makes the sum of the steady-growth “neutral” interest rate and the 
expected inflation rate fall short of the term/risk premium on long-term interest rates and 
loan rates. Section 5 discusses a number of theoretical issues that have featured 
prominently in the recent literature on the LT like the possibility of generating inflation to 
escape a LT, the “monetarist” definition of the LT and the role of the banking system in 
bringing about a LT. Section 6 concludes. 
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2.- The Liquidity Trap 
A LT is usually defined as a situation in which the real interest rate (in a closed 
economy without a government sector) at which saving at the employment rate consistent 
with constant inflation and investment would be equal is negative (Krugman, 1998, p. 
150). In a LT conventional monetary policy becomes ‘impotent because nominal interest 
rates are at or near zero: injecting monetary base into the economy has no effect, because 
base and bonds are viewed by the private sector as perfect substitutes’ (Krugman, 1998, 
p. 141). If we denote by ω  the minimum (ex-ante) actual real interest rate that a CB can 
set for a given expected inflation rate and by rn  the “neutral” interest rate, we may define 
a LT as a situation where: 
                                                     ωprn                                                                (1)    
where rn  is the long-term real interest rate which is neutral with respect to the inflation 
rate and tends neither to increase it nor to decrease it in the absence of supply shocks. If 
we think of r as a long-term interest rate, then ω  will be positive because lenders will 
require a time-varying term premium 0fμ  to grant credit or to purchase long-dated 
securities. Post-Keynesians insist that the time-varying nature of μ  stems mainly from 
changes in the degree of “liquidity preference” (hereafter LP) of investors and financial 
intermediaries.4 Next, if we denote by π e  the expected inflation rate we have that: 
                                                                                                                       (2)                                πμω e−=
By inserting (2) into (1), we have that an economy exhibits a LT if:  
                                                                                                                       (3) μπ penr +
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Expression (3) tells us that the lower are rn  and π e , and the higher is μ  the more 
likely it is that an economy will exhibit a LT. Finally, if we replace rn  in (3) by the 
steady-growth “neutral” interest rate and condition (3) holds, then we will say that the 
economy exhibits a “structural” LT (Palacio-Vera, 2009).  
 A number of authors have recently analyzed the likelihood of economies getting 
stuck in a LT as well as the policy options that will: (i) minimize the probability that the 
ZB becomes a binding constraint on monetary policy and (ii) remove this constraint in 
case the economy is in a LT. Two recent Journal Symposiums have been devoted to this 
issue; the 2000 Symposium on ‘Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound’ published in 
the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking and the 2004 Symposium on ‘Policies to deal 
with deflation’ in the American Economic Review. A summary of the former is in Blinder 
(2000) and an evaluation of the different proposals is in Bernanke and Reinhart (2004). It 
is not our purpose to review this large literature here. However, we may highlight two 
points on which there seems to be an emerging consensus. First, the mere existence of a 
ZB on nominal interest rates can engender a moderate deterioration in macroeconomic 
stability as the inflation target approaches zero and, hence, it is an important constraint on 
how conventional monetary policy can operate in a low inflation environment (Fuhrer 
and Madigan, 1997; Reifschneider and Williams, 2000; Mussa, 2000). In particular, 
studies usually find that there is a trade-off between the average rate of inflation and the 
variability of the output-gap so that the latter increases as the rate of inflation approaches 
zero and becomes negative (Orphanides and Wieland, 2000). Second, CBs should set a 
low but positive inflation target (preferably 2 percent). This is because the risk of hitting 
the ZB appears to be small down to inflation rates close to those currently pursued by 
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most CBs but gets much larger below that. Another aspect these studies address is the 
possibility that the economy enters a “deflationary spiral” once the ZB binds. The usual 
verdict is that this type of episode is very rare and thus it should not be a matter of 
concern. 
 Conversely, there is no emerging consensus on whether unconventional monetary 
policy options can take the economy out of a LT should it be necessary. Several authors 
have proposed a number of policy options for CBs to deal with the ZB should it arise 
(Goodfriend, 2000; Clouse at al., 2000; McCallum, 2000; Svensson, 2001; Buiter, 2003; 
Ito and Mishkin, 2004; Orphanides, 2004). These options include setting a carry tax on 
currency and vault cash as well as on electronic reserves, open market operations on 
long-term government bonds, foreign exchange intervention and price-level targeting. 
Yet, as noted in Reifschneider and Williams (2000, p. 943) ‘the likely effectiveness of 
such actions is unclear from a theoretical perspective, and they have never been put to a 
definitive test’. This view is shared by a number of authors who remain skeptical about 
the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy to spur activity when nominal 
interest rates are at zero (Freedman, 2000; Blinder, 2000; Bryant, 2000; Mussa, 2000). 
The words of Kazuo Ueda at the 1999 JMCB Conference in Woodstock (Vermont) serve 
to summarize the difficulties faced by a CB once the ZB on nominal rates binds: ‘Don’t 
put yourself in the position of zero interest rates. You’ll have to face a lot of difficulties. I 
can tell you it will be a lot more painful than you can possibly imagine’ (Ueda, 2000, 
p.1109).  
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3.- The New Consensus and the theory of the “liquidity trap” 
As emerges from the previous section, for a given expected rate of inflation, the 
likelihood that the economy exhibits a LT depends on the value of the “neutral” interest 
rate and the term/risk premium on long-dated securities and loan rates. Thus, any attempt 
to address the causes of the emergence of a LT needs to explain the determinants of these 
two variables. In mainstream economics the “neutral” interest rate is usually referred to 
as the “natural” interest rate, after Wicksell (1936). The modern notion of the “natural” 
interest rate is associated to the NC approach. For the sake of exposition, we take the 
study by Woodford (2003) as the canonical version of the NC. He defines the “natural” 
interest rate as ‘the equilibrium real rate of return in the case of fully flexible prices’ 
(Woodford, 2003, p. 248) and names his approach “neo-wicksellian” because output-gaps 
and, hence, changes in the inflation rate are explained by deviations of the actual real 
interest rate from the “natural” interest rate. In the “extended” version of his framework, 
demand shocks include fiscal policy, investment and “impatience” shocks. The latter 
modify the rate of time preference of the representative household. Supply shocks consist 
of productivity shocks to the production function of the representative firm, shocks to the 
disutility-of-labour function and changes in the amount of physical capital. He concludes 
that real ‘interest rates must increase in response to temporary increases in government 
purchases or in the impatience of households to consume and decrease in response to 
temporary increases in labor productivity or in the willingness of households to supply 
labor’ (Woodford, 2003, p. 250). Importantly, he admits that a range of shocks may 
render the “natural” interest rate negative, albeit he implies that this will be a transitory 
situation: 
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  ‘The present theory allows for variation over time in the natural rate for a variety 
of reasons, and there is no reason why it should not sometimes be negative. (The model 
does imply a positive average level of the natural rate, determined by the rate of time 
preference of the representative household)’ (Woodford, 2003, p. 251, emphasis added).   
 
To this date, there is no presentation of the NC model couched in a growth setting 
so we need to make use of “optimal” growth theory to extrapolate Woodford´s results to 
a growing economy. According to it, the optimality condition for saving yields the 
following “balanced growth” condition: 
                                            ϑσ ++= n
a
r*                                                            (4) 
where r*  denotes the steady-growth “natural” interest rate, a denotes the rate of labor-
augmenting technological change, n denotes the rate of population growth, σ  denotes the 
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, and ϑ  denotes the rate of time 
preference of the representative household.5 Since a and n will be positive in a growing 
economy, r*  is positive and its lower bound is ϑ .  
Several comments are in order. First, the literature conflates different meanings of 
the notion of a “natural” interest rate.6 This problem was recognized long time ago by 
Myrdal (1939) who noted that monetary equilibrium in Wicksell´s theory entails that the 
“natural” rate of interest must (i) equal the marginal productivity of real capital, (ii) 
equate the supply and the demand for savings at full employment and, (iii) guarantee a 
stable price level. Only the third meaning is compatible with our previous definition of 
the “neutral” interest rate albeit it needs to be adapted to a modern setting where it is the 
inflation rate and not the price level that is stable in the long run.7 This is because (i) we 
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will assume that the economy operates in the long run at an employment rate that is equal 
(or lower) than the rate of employment compatible with a constant inflation rate and this, 
in turn, corresponds to an employment rate that falls short of full employment and (ii) the 
notion of the marginal productivity of capital is flawed (Harcourt, 1969). Second, there is 
nothing natural about the “natural” interest rate since it depends, inter alia, on the 
government budget balance and so we think that the term “neutral” is preferable. Be that 
as it may, the role of the “natural” interest rate in the NC approach is equivalent to the 
role of the “neutral” interest rate as defined above since, as Woodford (2003, p. 248) 
himself notes ‘the natural rate of interest is just the real rate of interest required to keep 
aggregate demand equal at all times to the natural rate of output’.8   
Third, Woodford´s assumption that the average value of the “natural” interest rate 
is positive implies that the former returns in the long-run to a positive gravitation centre 
provided prices are fully flexible. In the standard NC model this occurs because it is 
assumed that (i) there is “perfect foresight” so that households´ expected future income 
stream equals future potential output per capita (ii) all households are perfectly 
creditworthy so they can smooth consumption as predicted by the standard life-
cycle/permanent income consumption model. Admittedly, there are some attempts to 
render the standard NC model more realistic by introducing household heterogeneity, 
financial intermediaries, and interest rate spreads into the standard model (Cúrdia and 
Woodford, 2008; Canzoneri et al., 2008).9 However, as noted in Goodhart (2007), some 
fundamental problems like the absence of default risk and, hence, credit rationing remain 
to be tackled. By contrast, we have argued elsewhere that the presence of uncertainty 
about future income and credit-rationing by financial intermediaries will result in the 
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existence of strong deviation-amplifying mechanisms in the form of “income” effects that 
affect consumption and investment demand and which may prevent the “neutral” interest 
rate from converging to the (positive) average rate of time preference in the long run 
(Palacio-Vera, 2009). The former means that the steady-growth “neutral” interest rate 
may become negative and the economy may thus remain stuck indefinitely in a LT. The 
argument is two-fold. First, and in stark contrast to the NC approach, the usual PK 
argument is that banks accommodate all creditworthy demands for credit, and ration all 
those demands not deemed creditworthy. In particular, Post-Keynesians insist that there 
is always some degree of credit-rationing and that it tends to increase near business cycle 
peaks and decrease near business cycle troughs due (mainly) to changes in the degree of 
LP of banks: 10  
 
‘A world of ultimate liquidity preference is a world where firms would refuse to 
produce for fear of indebtedness, where banks would refuse to lend for fear of loan 
defaults, and where consumers would refuse to spend for fear of unemployment’ (Lavoie, 
1996, p. 292).  
 
In turn, changes in the degree of credit-rationing by banks will tend to exacerbate 
output contractions thus reinforcing the power of deviation-amplifying mechanisms. 
Second, the joint existence of credit-rationing and uncertainty about future income 
implies that households will carry out some precautionary saving and that the latter will 
be proportional to the former. According to Carroll (2001, p. 25), if consumers are 
“impatient”, in the sense that if there were no uncertainty or liquidity constraints they 
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would spend more than current disposable income and “prudent” in the sense that they 
have a precautionary saving motive, then the existence of uncertainty about future 
income entails that the level of consumption of a representative household will, for every 
possible level of wealth, fall short of the level of consumption implied by the “perfect 
foresight” consumption model. As shown in Carroll (1992), there will be some target 
level of wealth such that, if actual wealth is greater than the target, impatience will 
outweigh prudence, precautionary saving will decrease and wealth will consequently fall, 
whereas if wealth is below the target, precautionary saving and wealth will increase. 
Precautionary saving is thus defined as the amount by which consumption falls as a 
consequence of uncertainty. Furthermore, Samwick (1995) shows that unconstrained 
consumers who exhibit a precautionary saving motive behave in ways qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to the behavior of liquidity-constrained consumers facing no 
uncertainty. This is because households who are liquidity-constrained exhibit less 
flexibility in responding to shocks since the effects of the shocks cannot be spread out 
over time. In addition, precautionary motives and liquidity constraints interact because 
the inability to borrow when times are bad provides an additional motive for 
accumulating assets when times are good, even for impatient consumers (Deaton, 1991).  
Fourth, as recognized by proponents of the NC, an economy that exhibits a low 
inflation rate and a negative output-gap may enter into a “deflationary spiral” in which a 
decrease in inflation endogenously raises the level of the real rate causing aggregate 
demand (hereafter AD) to weaken and push inflation down more, thereby raising the real 
interest rate even further (Reifschneider and Williams, 2000, p. 942). Hence, if a 
“deflationary spiral” is to be avoided, proponents of the NC approach need to assume that 
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the adjustment process described above will not be short-circuited by the adverse effect 
upon AD of a rising real interest rate. Arguably, the sluggish adjustment of goods prices 
may well prevent a “deflationary spiral” from setting off.11 However, if this were the 
case, then the “natural” interest rate could no longer be defined as ‘the equilibrium real 
rate of return in the case of fully flexible prices’, as Woodford does. In practice, the 
possibility that a “deflationary spiral” sets off is readily recognized by proponents of the 
NC although they tend to believe that this scenario may only come about in the wake of 
unusually large adverse shocks.12  
Finally, from the discussion above we may be tempted to conclude, as Woodford 
apparently does, that a LT may only come about whenever the “neutral” interest rate is 
very low or negative. However, as expression (3) above reflects, a LT may also come 
about even when the “neutral” interest rate and the expected inflation rate are positive. 
This will be the case if, due to a high degree of LP, the term/risk premium becomes large 
enough so as to satisfy condition (3). The importance of the term premium is (implicitly) 
recognized in Blinder (2006, pp. 47-48) when he notes that ‘long rates are terrible (and 
biased) predictors of future short rates… Just why this is so remains a major intellectual 
puzzle’. However, he fails to connect the empirical problems of the “expectations 
hypothesis” of the term structure of interest rates to the changes in the term/risk premium 
brought about by changes in the degree of LP.  
 
4.- The Post-Keynesian approach and the “neutral” interest rate 
We now expound a simple PK model for a closed economy without a government 
sector. We intend to utilize it as a benchmark to be contrasted to the NC and to discuss a 
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number of additional issues raised in recent contributions to the literature on the theory of 
the LT. We display the model in the first subsection and present the analysis of its steady 
growth properties and short-run behaviour in subsequent subsections.  
 
4.1.- The supply side 
Let us consider a one-sector economy with two inputs, labour and capital, and 
assume that (i) there is a large number of identical firms and (ii) they all utilize the same 
technology. If we aggregate across all firms in the economy, we may define potential 
output Y as: 
                                                        KvNY ⋅≤⋅= λ                                                       (5) 
where N  is the level of employment that keeps inflation constant in the absence of 
transitory supply shocks, K is the aggregate capital stock, and λ  and v are respectively 
the productivity of labour and capital when the factors are fully utilized. The current rate 
of capacity utilization is: 
                                                         1≤⋅= Kv
Yu                                                            (6) 
where Y is the actual level of output. Post-Keynesians like Rowthorn (1977) and Sawyer 
(1982) postulate the existence of a employment rate compatible with constant inflation in 
the short run (hereafter CIER) which results from the conflicting income claims of 
workers and firms so inflation will increase if the actual employment rate is higher than 
the CIER and vice-versa.13 Thus, the CIER can be interpreted as a short-run “inflation 
barrier” albeit one that may be affected by the level and time path of aggregate demand 
if, for instance, hysteresis effects are present. We define the rate of capacity utilization 
when YY =  as the “constant inflation capacity utilization” (hereafter CICU) or: 
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                                           1≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=⋅==
K
Le
vK
N
vvK
Yu λλ                                      (7) 
where we denote the by e  the CIER, by L the labour force and LeN ⋅= . For simplicity, 
we assume there is no overhead labour and firms are fully integrated, producing all the 
materials required for their final output so that prime costs are made up only of labour 
costs. We also assume that firms set a constant mark up over prime costs. The “natural” 
rate of growth is:                                                
                                                             angn +=                                                           (8) 
where  is the growth rate of labour productivitya λ .  
 
4.2.- The demand side 
The equilibrium condition in the goods market for a closed economy without a 
government sector when current output is equal to potential output is: 
                                                          IYzrs n =⋅),(                                                       (9) 
where s is the saving rate, I is (gross) investment, and z is a vector of variables to be filled 
below. rn  is the “neutral” interest rate which we define here as the real interest rate that 
makes planned saving at potential output equal to planned gross investment. It is better 
thought of as a long-term rate. If we divide (5) through by K and denote the rate of capital 
accumulation by g and the rate of depreciation of physical capital by ψ  we get: 
                                                         ψ+=⋅⋅ guvs                                                        (10) 
We now turn our attention to functions s and g. We assume that the saving rate s 
is a function of the rate of inflation π , the rate of growth of output , the real interest 
rate r and a measure of shocks 
yˆ
ε s  that includes changes in the degree of LP or:  
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                                            ),,ˆ,( επ sryss =                                                       (11) 
where , , , 0ˆ fsy 0psπ 0fsr ε s  is a stochastic variable and the subscripts in function s 
denote partial derivatives. The positive sign of  is here justified by resort to Marglin´s 
(1984) “disequilibrium hypothesis” according to which household saving relative to 
disposable income increases when income rises faster than households can adapt their 
spending habits whereas the opposite occurs when income falls faster than households 
can rein in their spending. However, we must note that a positive sign of s  is also an 
implication of the “buffer-stock” theory of saving (Carroll, 1992, 2001) and the “life-
cycle theory of saving” (Modigliani and Cao, 2004).
s yˆ
yˆ
14 The positive sign of  is 
attributed to the presence of significant distribution effects rather than to households´ 
behaviour. To be sure, if we assume (realistically) that the average propensity to consume 
of net debtors is higher than that of net creditors, then a rise in the real interest rate will 
redistribute income away from net debtors and towards net creditors thereby raising the 
aggregate saving rate.
sr
15 The sign of  is attributed to the presence of inside-debt effects 
that depress private spending when, for a given real interest rate, inflation decreases and 
vice-versa.     
sπ
Next, let us assume that firms have a desired rate of capacity utilization  so 
they expand productive capacity whenever  and stop expanding it whenever 
. A possible justification for this assumption is that firms prefer to keep some 
capacity idle in order to respond rapidly to unanticipated favourable demand shocks and 
to deter the entry of potential rivals into the industry (Spence, 1977).
1* pu
uu *f
uu *p
16 This can be 
conveniently captured by defining the rate of accumulation, g as: 
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                                                                                       (12)             ),( * ε guufuvg −⋅⋅=
where  is inversely proportional to the size of the construction and capital goods 
delivery lags, 
0ff u
0)0( fff = , 0)( =ε gE  and ε g  represents shocks affecting g. Parameter 
f  represents the ratio of current net investment to output when . It captures firms´ 
expected future demand growth and, hence, it is closely linked to expected profitability. 
In turn, we assume that the investment function f adopts a linear form or: 
uu *=
                                               )(),( ** uuffuuf ug −⋅+=− ε                                          (13) 
Inserting (12) into (10) we obtain the equilibrium condition in the goods market 
when YY =  or:  
                                
uvu
ufrys gsn
ψεεπ +−= ),(),,ˆ,( *                                     (14) 
Next, we assume that the saving function s adopts a linear form or: 
                                     rssysss ry ⋅+⋅+⋅+= ππˆˆ                                            (15)                                 
where s  is a shift term determined by households´ preferences, institutional factors, and 
the degree of LP. If we insert (15) and (13) into (14) and re-arrange, we obtain the (short-
run) rate of growth of output:  
                                        
uvss
rssuufsfy
yy
ru
⋅⋅+
⋅−⋅−−⋅+−=
ˆˆ
*)(
ˆ ψππ                               (16) 
Finally, a solution for the “neutral” interest rate rn  can be obtained by setting 
uu =  in (16) and rearranging: 
                      
s
sysuvu
ufsf
r
r
yu
n
πψ π ⋅−⋅−⋅+−⋅+−=
ˆ)( ˆ*
                           (17) 
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Therefore, an increase in the degree of uncertainty about future income will tend 
to increase “precautionary saving” by households s  and lower f  thereby pushing rn  
downward and vice-versa.17  
 
4.3.- Steady growth analysis  
 Steady growth equilibrium corresponds to a period of sufficient length to enable 
all variables in the economy to settle at constant rates in the absence of new disturbances.  
If we denote by π *
yˆ
 the inflation target of the CB we have that, in a hypothetical steady 
growth scenario, , ggn == uuu *== , ππ *=  and 0==εε gs  so that the two following 
conditions must be satisfied: 
                                                       ygfuv n ˆ
* ==⋅⋅                                                       (18) 
and                                                                                       (19) ψπ +=⋅⋅ guvrgs nn *** ),,(
 Equation (18) tells us that, in steady growth, the rate of accumulation must equal 
the “natural” rate of growth. Equation (19) is the counterpart to equation (14) for the 
steady growth case. In order to get an explicit solution for the steady growth “neutral” 
interest rate r*  we insert (15) into (19) and re-arrange: 
                                            
s
gsss
uv
g
r
r
y n
n 1
ˆ
*
*
* ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⋅
+= πψ π                                       (20) 
Thus, r*  is a function of the “natural” rate of growth, the target inflation rate, the 
depreciation rate and the aggregate saving rate. It can be interpreted as the real interest 
rate where ‘all markets are in equilibrium and there is therefore no pressure for any 
resources to be redistributed or growth rates for any variables to change’ (Archibald and 
20 
Hunter, 2001, p. 20) and it is equivalent to the ‘equilibrium’ real interest rate embedded 
in Taylor´s rule (Taylor, 1993). It follows that:                                                            
                                                               01
*
p
ss
r
r
−=∂
∂                                                   (21) 
The negative sign of (21) reflects that an increase in the saving rate due, for 
instance, to an increase in the degree of LP of households, pushes r*  down and vice-
versa. Likewise, a decrease in the “natural” growth rate will also push r*  downward: 
                                         011 ˆ*
*
f
s
s
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r
r
y
n
⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅=∂
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Therefore, r*  may become negative if, for instance,  is very low and g n s  is 
relatively large due to a high degree of uncertainty about future income. As such, it has 
been argued that the main cause of the stagnation experienced by the Japanese economy 
in the last decade or so is its high saving rate and low “natural” rate of growth (Krugman, 
1998, pp. 173-4; Nakatani and Skott, 2007).18  
 
5.- Some issues regarding the theory of the liquidity trap 
 We now address three issues that affect the relevance of the definition of the LT 
provided above. The purpose of this section is to show that the definition of the LT 
encapsulated in expression (3) above together with the PK view of the determination of 
the “neutral” interest rate is general enough as to encompass any situation characterized 
by the fact that conventional monetary policy becomes ineffective.   
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5.1.- The “liquidity trap” versus the “credit crunch” view  
The competing explanation to the LT hypothesis in Japan is the so-called “credit 
crunch” view. This explanation focuses on the contraction of the supply of credit (credit 
crunch) by Japanese banks in the 1990´s caused by massive nonperforming loans 
accumulating in the financial system (Cargill et al., 1997; Palley, 2000). The argument 
has two parts. The first part focuses on the substantial decline in bank capital due to the 
accumulation of bad loans held by Japanese banks. According to Hutchison (2000), the 
capital asset ratio of the 20 largest Japanese financial institutions fell significantly 
between 1994 and the end of 1998. The second part of the “credit crunch” view focuses 
on the cautious lending attitude of Japanese banks owing to their recent experience with 
bankruptcies and nonperforming loans. Krugman (1998, pp. 174-77) admits that Japan 
faced a huge problem of bad loans in the late nineties and that these loans were in part a 
legacy of the burst of the asset bubble of the 1980s. He also notes that a look at the data 
does seem to support this view because both base and narrow money increased robustly 
since 1995 but broad monetary aggregates grew more slowly and bank credit stagnated. 
Notwithstanding, he rejects the view that the troubles of the Japanese banks were central 
to Japan´s macroeconomic difficulties in that period. Instead, he argues that ‘given an 
economy in a liquidity trap, this sort of disconnect between monetary base, aggregates, 
and bank credit is to be expected even if the banks are financially healthy’ (Krugman, 
1998, p. 175). He adds that, according to the textbook model of bank behaviour, in the 
absence of a bank run, a bank of questionable solvency that manages to hold on to its 
deposits thanks to the existence of a government guarantee has an incentive to overlend 
to risky projects. He argues that, in the case of Japan, there were few allegations of 
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credit-rationing before the second half of 1997 and that only by early 1998 did the “credit 
crunch” become widely accepted. Hence, according to him, the former did not cause but 
deepened Japan´s slump: 
 
‘A review of press reports also makes the reasons for the emergence of credit 
constraints in late 1997 quite clear. The immediate forcing event was the announcement, 
in October 1997, of new capital adequacy standards, to be effective from April 1998. To 
meet this standard, banks began cutting bank on loans that would have required larger 
capital backing. In other words, the financial problems of the banks only became a drag 
on aggregate demand when the government began half-hearted efforts to come to grips 
with those problems’ (Krugman, 1998, p. 177).        
 
Krugman´s argument aside, we believe that both the “macroeconomic” and the 
“credit crunch” view are encompassed in the definition of the LT proposed above. 
Specifically, a negative “neutral” interest rate and a low expected inflation rate are 
indicators of a low level of aggregate demand relative to potential output. Whether the 
ultimate cause of a negative “neutral” interest rate is a “credit crunch” or any other 
macroeconomic factor is, for some purposes, not important, as long as this is the case. 
This is because there is likely to be a two-way causality between macroeconomic 
prospects and the degree of credit-rationing by banks so it may be rather difficult to 
identify in practice the ultimate source of the economic malaise. For instance, a LT may 
be brought about by a substantial worsening in macroeconomic prospects initially 
unrelated to problems in the banking sector but, eventually, the decrease in the level of 
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economic activity may reduce the liquidity and capital ratios of banks thereby forcing 
them to restrain the amount of credit they grant to the non-bank private sector. Likewise, 
if an unfavourable event in the “financial” side of the economy brings about a “credit 
crunch” this may eventually depress the level of economic activity so as to cause a LT.19 
As noted above, Post-Keynesians believe that the banking system tends to amplify rather 
than to cushion financial crisis. Specifically, if an economy enters a recession for reasons 
other than a drastic reduction in bank lending, then the LP of banks will rise and this, in 
turn, will exacerbate the output contraction owing to a combination of an increase in the 
degree of credit-rationing and a rise in the risk premium embedded in loan rates. 
Therefore, we think that the definition of the LT proposed above is an encompassing one; 
it does not attribute the emergence of a LT to a specific factor and it is compatible with a 
range of different potential factors making condition (3) be fulfilled.        
 
5.2.- The role of inflation expectations 
 Expression (3) suggests that a possible escape route from a LT is the creation of 
inflationary expectations as proposed in Krugman (1998) and elaborated in Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2003). The argument is that by inducing inflation expectations the real 
interest rate will (when the ZB binds) decrease and this will stimulate the economy out of 
the LT. According to Krugman (1998), if a CB can credibly commit to pursue inflation 
and ratify it when it comes, it should be able to increase inflationary expectations despite 
the absence of any traction on the economy by means of conventional monetary policy. 
In the specific case of Japan, he proposes an annual inflation target of 4 percent for 15 
years. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) present a more fully dynamic analysis of the 
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problem. To them, a commitment to create subsequent inflation is presented as a 
commitment to keep interest rates low for some time in the future. As noted in Blinder 
(2000, p. 1098), Krugman´s proposal to escape a LT seems to be the right thing to do, at 
least, in theory. However, he notes that it is hard to see how it can possibly work in a 
country where the average inflation rate is very low and may even be negative. That is, 
the problem is that if expected inflation closely tracks current inflation, there is no 
obvious manner through which a CB can overcome the “inverted credibility” problem, 
i.e. to convince the private sector that it will create inflation and will not attempt to undo 
this policy once the economy has escaped the LT. This means that, the so-called 
“expectations” channel to the monetary policy transmission mechanism may not be 
operative when an economy exhibits a LT and that, consequently, a CB can only raise 
inflation expectations by actually generating inflation but, unfortunately, it cannot 
generate inflation as long as the economy exhibits a LT.20 Thus, the right question to ask 
when the ZB binds is whether there is anything a CB can do to stimulate aggregate 
demand when conventional monetary policy becomes ineffective. We address this 
question below.    
 
5.3.- The “monetarist” theory of the liquidity trap  
According to the standard NC model, once the ZB binds, the CB has exhausted its 
ability to stimulate the economy. Monetarists, among others, reject this conclusion and 
argue instead that, once the policy rate becomes zero, the CB should embark on a strategy 
of monetization, or quantitative easing, and judge the stimulus of its policies in terms of 
the rate of growth of the money supply rather than by the level of its (real) interest rate. 
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Monetarists make two claims. First, they argue that money may directly affect aggregate 
demand. Second, they argue that, even if money does not “directly” affect aggregate 
demand, the transmission mechanism is much more complicated than the simple IS curve 
specification suggests since money could still play a role as a proxy for channels that may 
be difficult to quantify. In particular, when monetarists such as Friedman and Meiselman 
(1963) and Brunner and Meltzer (1963, 1968) have discussed the transmission 
mechanism, they have described monetary policy as operating through the prices and 
yields of a broad range of marketable (financial and real) assets. As a result of it, they 
argue that the IS curve in the standard NC model is misspecified because it allows only 
for an interest-rate channel and ignores either a “direct” effect of money or an “indirect” 
effect on aggregate spending through the prices and yields of assets other than short-term 
securities. A theoretical justification for the existence of a “direct” effect of money on 
aggregate demand is discussed in Woodford (2003, ch. 2) and McCallum (2000).21 
Svensson (2001) summarizes the conditions as follows: 
 
 ‘[A] direct money effect would arise, if real balances entered the representative 
agent´s utility function and this utility function was not additively separable in 
consumption and real balances but had a positive cross derivative.’ (Svensson, 2001, p. 
291). 
  
 However, Woodford (2003, ch. 2), McCallum (2000) and Svensson (2001) argue 
that reasonable parameterizations of the utility function lead to very small coefficients on 
money in the IS equation. Likewise, using M2 as the measure of money supply, Ireland 
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(2001) finds little empirical support for the importance of nonseparable utility. Despite 
the lack of empirical support for the hypothesis of nonseparable utility, monetarists back 
their claims with empirical evidence that shows that real money base growth matters for 
real economic activity, for a given short-term real interest rate. For instance, in an 
empirical study with U.S. data for the period 1951 through 1986 Koenig (1990) found 
that real money balances entered consumption regressions significantly. Meltzer (2001) 
uses historical data from periods of deflation in the U.S. economy to show that changes in 
real money balances appear at times to dominate changes in real interest rates as 
indicators of the direction of change induced by monetary actions. Furthermore, he 
replicates the study by Koenig (1990) and finds even more supportive results for the 
monetarist cause when the sample period is extended by 30%. His interpretation of these 
results is that the change in real balances is a mixture of a pure (Haberler-Pigou-Patinkin) 
wealth effect and the changes in wealth induced by changes in the relative yields of a 
wide range of assets. Finally, Nelson (2002) presents evidence for the US and the UK 
that reaffirms Meltzer´s evidence that real money base growth matters for real economic 
activity for a given short-term real interest rate.22 He concludes that money is a superior 
index of monetary policy effects. Notwithstanding these results, the conventional wisdom 
is that changes in real base money have, if anything, a negligible effect on private real 
wealth and, hence on aggregate demand. The quantitative irrelevance of the “direct” 
effect of changes in money on aggregate demand and the empirical results obtained in 
Koenig (1990), Meltzer (2001) and Nelson (2002) suggest that the monetarist story is 
circumscribed to the thesis that changes in real monetary base exert “indirect” effects on 
real aggregate demand through many real interest rates, implicit or explicit, that are 
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relevant for economic activity, and that the expected real interest rate on short-term 
securities is thus an inadequate indicator for these yields. As we discuss below, this has 
some implications for the definition of the LT presented in Section 2.     
 In a recent contribution, Meltzer (2001, p.3) defines a LT as ‘a condition in which 
the demand for nominal balances equals the stock of nominal balances at unchanged 
prices and interest rates, for all values of the nominal stock. Additions to the nominal 
stock cannot be transmitted to the real sector or the price level because the interest rate 
has reached a floor at or near zero’. He argues that the traditional (Keynesian) LT makes 
short-term Treasury Bills (hereafter TB) or similar securities a perfect substitute for base 
money or bank reserves so that exchanging one for the other makes nothing of interest. 
By contrast, he claims that exchanging either money or TB for some other assets such as 
foreign currencies, domestic or foreign long-term bonds, equities, or commodities 
changes relative prices and real private wealth. In this hypothetical case, base money plus 
TB represents a composite good. Crucially, the former is a gross substitute for other 
assets; increasing either component, or both, is expansionary. According to him, for a LT 
to become effective, the composite asset ― money plus TB ― must be a perfect 
substitute for all other assets, that is, when the marginal rate of substitution of money for 
bonds goes to zero all marginal rates of substitution also must go to zero. If so, then all 
assets become part of a single composite good (Brunner and Meltzer, 1968). A corollary 
of this is that, as long as some assets other than money and TB remain gross substitutes, a 
LT means only that one row and one column in the matrix of marginal rates of 
substitution has been removed but, importantly, all other marginal rates of substitution 
remain and, hence, monetary policy remains effective. In short, the “monetarist” position 
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implies that a LT is not possible except in the limit when all marginal rates of substitution 
are zero. A number of authors have recently expressed views that coincide with Brunner 
and Meltzer´s. Referring to the recent Japanese stagnation Orphanides (2004) argues that: 
 
‘The quantitative easing pursued over the last 2 years has been associated with an 
overall reduction of longer-than-overnight interest rates, even after the overnight rate 
reached a level of almost zero. These developments indicate that despite the near-zero 
short-term interest rate in Japan, it would be misleading to say that the Japanese economy 
has been stuck in a liquidity trap… Additional monetary expansion continues to have 
some bite because the prices and yields of all assets, not merely “the” short-term nominal 
rate of interest, jointly determine aggregate demand’ (Orphanides, 2004, pp. 117-18).   
      
 Orphanides (2004, p. 119) distinguishes between “expectation” effects and 
“direct” effects of a monetary expansion. “Expectation” effects can alter current long-
term real interest rates in two ways. First, convincing the private sector that monetary 
policy will remain expansionary longer will help lower expected future nominal short-
term interest rates and, therefore, longer-term nominal interest rates. Second, convincing 
the private sector that expansionary monetary policy will result in a higher inflation rate 
in the future could lower current real long-term interest rates. As for “direct” effects, the 
argument is that the imperfect substitutability among assets implies that the power to alter 
their relative supplies through open market operations has a direct effect on prices. 
Orphanides (2004) suggests that the effect may be rather small but insists that, in this 
case, the size of the effect is immaterial given the infinite potential supply of money:  
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 ‘The only difference between “near-perfect” and more “imperfect” substitutes is 
the size of the money printing run and open-market operations that would be required to 
achieve any given desired effect on a price’ (Orphanides, 2004, p. 119). 
 
      He concludes that either the “direct” or the “expectation” effect of monetary 
actions could, in principle, provide sufficient traction to monetary policy when the 
overnight nominal interest rate is stuck at zero. Likewise, Meyer (2001, p.5) argues that 
as long as short-term government bonds are not perfect substitutes for longer-term 
government bonds and private bonds, then large open-market purchases of long-term 
government bonds could lower the long-term government bond rate relative to the policy 
rate, with potential spillover effects on longer-term private rates. Notwithstanding this 
possibility, he argues that if aggregate demand is to be stimulated through monetization 
‘such unconventional policy operations more likely would need to be implemented on a 
bold scale’ (Meyer, 2001, p. 6). Blinder (2000) discuses this possibility and argues that: 
 
‘If the pure expectations theory of the term structure holds and short rates are 
expected to remain (approximately) zero for a while, then intermediate-term rates will be 
approximately zero, too. And, to bring down truly long rates, the bank would have to 
convince the market that the zero-interest-rate period would last many years!’ (Blinder, 
2000, p. 1097). 
 
However, he argues that the pure expectations theory does not hold because long 
rates include a (positive) time-varying term/risk premium μ  which is potentially affected 
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by changing the relative supplies of short and long-term bonds. Be that as it may, even if 
massive purchases of long-term bonds could push long-term interest rates to zero by 
squeezing μ , there is no guarantee that they will provide enough stimulus since ‘the real 
bond rate could still be too high’ (Meyer, 2001, p. 5).  
 We now comment briefly on three additional channels through which a process of 
monetization could, in theory, provide some stimulus to the economy. First, McCallum 
(2000) has recommended foreign-exchange interventions to depreciate the currency and, 
in this way, stimulate the economy when the nominal interest rate is zero. However, his 
argument either ignores uncovered interest rate parity or relies on a “portfolio-balance” 
effect whereby the relative supply of domestic- and foreign-currency denominated assets 
affects the foreign exchange premium and thereby the exchange rate. According to 
Svensson (2001, p. 279), one problem with McCallum´s argument is that, although huge 
foreign–exchange interventions are likely to affect the exchange rate because of the 
expectations of future depreciation they may induce, ‘most empirical work on the effect 
of sterilized foreign-exchange interventions indicates that the portfolio effect is small or 
negligible’. Besides, as noted in Blinder (2000), if uncovered interest rate parity holds, 
then with the short-term nominal interest rate stuck at zero, the expected rate of 
depreciation is locked in by the foreign short-term interest rate. In addition, if purchasing 
power parity theory (hereafter PPP) holds, then the expected rate of depreciation of the 
domestic currency will mirror the expected inflation differential but, if agents´ inflation 
expectations are correct, the real exchange rate will remain constant and, hence, there 
will be no stimulus to the economy. Be that as it may, Blinder (2000, p. 1096) argues that 
PPP theory does not hold in practice so this breaks the link between expected future 
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exchange rate and the expected future price level and, hence, it opens up the possibility of 
reducing both the spot and the expected future exchange rates through large purchases 
(sales) of the foreign (domestic) currency thereby achieving currency depreciation while 
maintaining covered interest rate parity. The extent to which such purchases will help 
depreciate the currency depends on the degree of substitutability on the margin between 
foreign and domestic bills/bonds and on the magnitude of the intervention. The larger the 
degree of substitutability is, the larger the magnitude of the interventions will have to be 
for the CB to depreciate its currency. According to Blinder (2000, p. 1096), ‘very large 
interventions may be needed to move the exchange rate’. Lastly, Svensson (2001, p. 280) 
recommends a temporary exchange-rate peg backed by a commitment by the CB to buy 
and sell unlimited amounts of foreign exchange at the given pegged exchange rate. In 
turn, the temporary exchange-rate peg should be accompanied by (i) the announcement of 
a price-level target path corresponding to a positive long-run inflation target above the 
current price level and (ii) the abandonment of the peg in favour of price-level or 
inflation targeting once the price-level target path has been reached.  
Another possibility is the purchase of private assets like equities and real estate. 
Doing so seems quite feasible and it would have an expansionary effect on the economy. 
However, as noted in Blinder (2000), one problem is that there may be legal impediments 
in some countries and, even if such impediments do not exist, there are still some serious 
“political” problems to overcome since the CB will have to decide which companies´ 
equities or which real estate to buy and in what amounts. Finally, there is the possibility 
of carrying out large purchases of domestically-produced goods and services financed by 
printing high-powered money. Again, there is no question that such purchases would 
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stimulate the economy.23 However, this type of operation of the CB is really a fiscal 
policy and not a monetary policy operation     
 To finish off, our overall assessment of the discussion above is that there is no 
question that there are a number of unconventional monetary policy operations that a CB 
can use to provide stimulus to the economy when the short-term nominal interest rate is 
stuck at zero. However, as some authors have emphasized, the scale of the open-market 
purchases of assets other than short-term securities would have to be massive for them to 
have a significant effect on aggregate demand. In addition, when open-market operations 
consist of the (money-financed) purchase of assets, goods and services, they represent 
fiscal rather than monetary policy operations. In view of this, our main objection to 
Brunner and Meltzer´s definition of the LT is that it refers to a scenario that, for all 
practical purposes, appears to be irrelevant; there are always some assets other than short-
term securities that a CB can purchase in exchange for high-powered money and that, if 
implemented in a sufficiently large scale, will eventually let the economy escape a LT. 
By contrast, our (and Krugman´s) definition of the LT refers to a scenario that may occur 
in practice, as the protracted Japanese stagnation that started in the mid-nineties shows. 
That is, it denotes a scenario in which conventional monetary policy operations are 
ineffective. We believe it is such definition of the LT that is of interest for policy-makers 
since it identifies situations where they may be forced to resort to unconventional (and 
problematic) monetary policy actions to spur the economy.       
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6.- Conclusion 
In this study we provided a formal definition of the “liquidity trap” (LT) 
according to which, a LT arises if a combination of high precautionary saving, low 
investment and stringent conditions for access to bank credit stemming from a high 
degree of liquidity preference makes the sum of the “neutral” interest rate and the 
expected inflation rate fall short of the term/risk premium on long-term interest rates. We 
then compared the “New Consensus” (NC) in macroeconomics as expounded in 
Woodford (2003) and the Post-Keynesian (PK) approach regarding the causes of a LT 
(Palacio-Vera, 2009). We argued that in the NC approach a LT is a phenomenon caused 
by unusually large transitory shocks that depress the “neutral” interest rate temporarily. 
We argued that this is an implication of the neoclassical premise that there is a 
gravitation centre towards which the “natural” interest rate converges in the long run 
provided prices are fully flexible. By contrast, we argued that in the PK approach an 
economy may also exhibit a “structural” or long-lasting LT even in the absence of large 
adverse shocks. Finally, we discussed a number of theoretical issues recently raised in the 
rapidly growing literature on the LT including the relation between the theory of the LT 
and the so-called “credit crunch” view, the role of inflation expectations as a possible 
escape from a LT, and the “monetarist” critique of the conventional (Keynesian) 
definition of the LT.  
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becomes infinite at a (low) long-term nominal interest rate owing to the behavior of speculators in the bond 
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the original explanation and focuses on the existence of a ZB for the short-term nominal interest rate as the 
ultimate cause of the problem.    
    
2 Expositions of the NC approach can be found in Clarida et al. (1999) and Meyer (2001) and a recent 
critical review is in Arestis and Sawyer (2008).  
  
3 This definition of the neutral interest rate differs from Keynes´ (1936, p. 243) definition in that he views 
the former as the long-term interest rate that yields full-employment whereas we define it as the long-term 
interest rate that yields an employment rate that keeps inflation constant.  
 
4 For instance, Wells (1983, p. 533) argues that ‘liquidity preference determines not the long rate of interest 
but the spread between the short and the long rates’. 
 
5 For this example, we assume “constant relative risk aversion” preferences of the representative household 
and that the utility of each future generation is weighted equally irrespective of size.  
42 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 The classical presentation of the notion of the “natural” interest rate is in Wicksell (1936[1898]).    
 
7 This third meaning is emphasized in Cassel (1928).  
 
8 In addition, Woodford (2003, p. 244) notes that ‘it is a long-term real rate of interest rather than a short 
rate, that determines aggregate demand in this model’ and he refers to agents´ expectations about future 
short-term real interest rates as key determinants of aggregate demand. 
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period 1991-2002, inflation turned negative in the second half of the 1990s but, after 1998, core inflation 
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(Stockhammer, 2008, p. 495).   
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effect. According to it, changes in the real value of the monetary base brought about, for instance, by 
changes in the price level, affect aggregate demand through changes in aggregate consumption. However, 
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